Here are a few common bankruptcy misconceptions
• “Bankruptcy will discharge every single debt I have.” That’s not necessarily true, depending on your situation. For instance, student loans cannot be discharged in general, although the Fairness For Struggling Students Act would allow students to discharge private student loans under a bankruptcy plan. Alimony and child support or similar obligations also fall into the category of “not discharged.”
Source: lucascountyohiobankruptcylaw.com
Video: How Bankruptcy Works
Get Free Bankruptcy Advice for Filing Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Online
The technological advancement and innovation of internet have made everything very easy and instant. The same is the case with the bankruptcy services. Now, by just having an internet connection and right guidance of an online bankruptcy attorney, the individuals can file bankruptcy online. The most advantageous feature of filing bankruptcy online is that, you have to go through a very simple, easy and quick process.Ways to File BankruptcyThere are many ways to file bankruptcy under any Law it may be Chapter 7 Bankruptcy, Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, Chapter 13 or Chapter 15 Bankruptcy. The first way is personal filing. Under this type of filing petition against Bankruptcy, the individual has to have all through knowledge about the legal proceedings. The second way is to hire one of the expert Bankruptcy Lawyers. The third and last option that remains is filing Bankruptcy online. There are many Bankruptcy filing services available online. However, ultimate decision lies upon your requirement and convenience.What is the process to file Bankruptcy Online?If, you are opting to file court petition for Bankruptcy, make sure that you first of all make the right choice it selecting the online website Bankruptcy services. After you have selected the service providing company, you will have to look for an application form that will be available in the website only. This online form will be free. Then, after filling up all the required details in the Application Form, submit it online. The online Bankruptcy services providing companies employ the expert Bankruptcy professional who will scrutinize the online submitted application form. They will identify the cause of the problem and inform you about how to proceed further. For e.g. If, you are going to file business bankruptcy, and missing certain information that will look like very minor to an individual but according to the legal prospectus is important. In such case the attorney will suggest the correction. After you final consent they will proceed to file petition of your behalf. Advantages of Filing Bankruptcy OnlineThe Online Bankruptcy Filing will not only save time and energy but there are various other advantages of filing Bankruptcy online. Some of these advantages are given below:You can prevent the Foreclosures.Re-establish your positive credit rating.Construct fresh Financial Status.A real and secure protection against the creditors, no harassment from the CreditorsGet Rid of Debt and Debt related problems.Eliminate the financial stress and worries.Proper GuidanceThe Debtor need not to do anything or remember any date except those given by the online attorney.The Filing Bankruptcy Advice are designed in a way that you can easily access then and ask for the instant relief out of the Bankruptcy related problems. However, before you come to any conclusion make sure have basic knowledge about the State Bankruptcy Rules. Source: texaslemonlawfor2012.com
Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com
GM: A Model for How Bankruptcy Works?
There is still one other loose end. The TARP program was intended to aid financial institutions, which does not seem to include Chrysler or GM. But who can challenge this transaction if in fact it did not come within the scope of the TARP program? Clearly, someone should be allowed (in principle) to say that taxpayer money was improperly used to lard New GM and New Chrysler with sufficient dollars to help fund the UAW benefit plans. Why, one might ask, are the retired workers from Chrysler worth special treatment relative to the retired police officers in Indiana, who had to settle for 30 cents on the dollar? But those questions will never be resolved for the simple reason that under modern American constitutional law no taxpayer ever has standing to challenge a transaction that affects all taxpayers. We thus never get to the merits of the deal. This taxpayer-standing rule has been in effect for close to 90 years, and throughout its history it has aided the expansion of State power by shielding dubious transactions from judicial review. The far better rule is to follow the corporate practice whereby any shareholder can challenge the legality of a transaction that affects all. Source: thefreemanonline.org Source: medicalbankruptcyco.com
Source: filebankruptcyco.com
GM: A Model for How Bankruptcy Works?
General Motor’s record profit for the year 2011 is making headlines these days, with President Obama and others claiming the profit points to the success of government bailout. Just two years ago the company was in dire straits and filing for bankruptcy; closing plants, winning changes in labor contracts, and losing the weight of weaker product lines and dealerships. The government stepped in with $49.5 billion in federal aid to help the ailing company recover, in the hope of keeping jobs. But is the success story a true picture of how bankruptcy works?
Source: longislandbankruptcyadvice.com
GM: A Model for How Bankruptcy Works?
There is still one other loose end. The TARP program was intended to aid financial institutions, which does not seem to include Chrysler or GM. But who can challenge this transaction if in fact it did not come within the scope of the TARP program? Clearly, someone should be allowed (in principle) to say that taxpayer money was improperly used to lard New GM and New Chrysler with sufficient dollars to help fund the UAW benefit plans. Why, one might ask, are the retired workers from Chrysler worth special treatment relative to the retired police officers in Indiana, who had to settle for 30 cents on the dollar? But those questions will never be resolved for the simple reason that under modern American constitutional law no taxpayer ever has standing to challenge a transaction that affects all taxpayers. We thus never get to the merits of the deal. This taxpayer-standing rule has been in effect for close to 90 years, and throughout its history it has aided the expansion of State power by shielding dubious transactions from judicial review. The far better rule is to follow the corporate practice whereby any shareholder can challenge the legality of a transaction that affects all. Source: thefreemanonline.org
Source: medicalbankruptcyco.com
How Bankruptcy Works in Texas
When individuals and businesses file bankruptcy, the purpose is to allow for a fresh start when they find themselves in untenable financial situations and burdened by debt. The fresh start comes from liquidation, reorganization or repayment of debt over a long period, usually years. The important thing to note is that everyone’s situation is unique, and in order to file optimally, it’s critical to understand how each type of filing will impact your life. Partnering with a skilled lawyer is usually the best way to ensure a best-possible resolution for your situation.
Source: bljlaw.com
The Origin of Bankruptcy and How It Works
Bankruptcy is from the Latin word “baricus” or a bench and “ruptus”, which means broken. Banks are referred to as benches that usually contain information pertaining to bills of exchange and other tolls. If a banker failed to pursue their business operation, they have to break the bank. The main purpose of this is to inform the public that they will no longer operate the business.
Source: thegreenmarketingguru.com
Five bankruptcy myths dispelled
There are many reasons people hesitate to file bankruptcy-misunderstandings, fear that credit will never repair, and the stigma attached to debt relief. When considering bankruptcy to reduce unwanted or unmanageable debt, it is important to have a clear understanding of how bankruptcy works, including the risks and consequences of filing for Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 bankruptcy in Minnesota. Here are five common myths:
Source: moshierbankruptcylaw.com
Bankruptcy In The UK And How It Works
In these challenging economic times, it is no surprise that many individuals are looking to the internet in the hopes of obtaining as much free legal advice as possible before deciding to retain a bankruptcy attorney. One popular site for exchanging such information (along with practically anything else imaginable) is Craigslist.com. Craigslist is more commonly known as a sort of online garage sale. However, because it is free to post, it is quickly becoming a forum both for bankruptcy attorneys to offer their services and for consumers to look for help. There are two specific places within Craigslist where such information is commonly exchanged: under Legal Services and in the legal Discussion Forums. (Such information is also occasionally posted under Legal Jobs but these entries are more commonly created by law firms interested in associating with other bankruptcy attorneys). In perusing the Legal Services section of the Source: nationalbankruptcyforum.com Source: chapter9bankruptcyco.com
Source: chapter9bankruptcyco.com
Beware of these five bankruptcy myths
Myth #4: Bankruptcy permanently ruins credit. Immediately after filing bankruptcy, you may start seeing credit offers in the mail. Secured credit cards (requiring a deposit) with low limit credit lines can often be obtained within months. When you start making regular, on time payments, you can begin to see an increase in your credit score. You should always keep an eye on your credit report to make sure debts are properly discharged. Some bankruptcy filers are able to obtain a mortgage within two or three years.
Source: clevelendtnbankruptcyblog.com
The costs of bankruptcy, the investment of debt relief
Recent media attention has shed light on the reality that bankruptcy can be costly.For many, the price of bankruptcy may seem too high, considering that filing is intended to help alleviate debt. Before making any decisions about bankruptcy, it is important to have a clear understanding of how it works, how it will affect your finances, your credit, and whether it is right for you. Despite upfront costs, Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 bankruptcy may remain the solution you need to achieve debt relief.
Source: losangelescountybankruptcyattorneys.com
How Exemption Laws Work Inside and Outside of Bankruptcy
While the primary focus on our forum is their application to bankruptcy, exemption laws apply outside of bankruptcy court as well. When a consumer is judgment proof, all of the property they own is protected by exemption laws. This means that even if a creditor gets a judgment through a collection lawsuit, there is no property they can attach to satisfy the debt. One of your creditors could get a judgment against you for $1,000,000 and would have no rights to any of your stuff if it is all exempt. By contrast, judgment creditors can attach wages and property that are non-exempt. For example, the state of Alabama does not have a specific automobile exemption. Instead, debtors are permitted to protect up to $3000 worth of personal property (which includes cars, furniture etc.). If an Alabama debtor found themselves being pursued by a creditor, and owned a classic car worth $20,000, some of the equity in that car would be nonexempt and therefore exposed to attachment by creditors.
Source: nationalbankruptcyforum.com
Bob Sarozek of Huntington Beach said he feels torn about a move to St. Callistus, which is less than a mile away. He said he started attending what is now known as the Crystal Cathedral when the Rev. Robert H. Schuller preached from the top of a drive-in snack bar. He said he will follow the congregation, but will always know the current site as the Crystal Cathedral, despite what the Catholic Church names it.
The moment that you seek a San Diego bankruptcy lawyer, they will be able to assess your financial status and advice you on what needs to be done. It is possible to get out your financial mess without necessarily having to file for bankruptcy. Your attorney will be able to give you a workable guideline on how to get off the huge piles of debts. In addition, he will be able to handle all the incoming calls and certification letters from your creditors professionally.
Debt settlement companies charge outrageous fees. If you compare what a bankruptcy attorney charges to what a debt settlement company charges, the debt settlement company will almost always be more expensive. Typically, your fee will be several thousand dollars. To make matters worse, these companies will not negotiate with your creditors until they are paid in full. In other words, for the first six months to a year, your monthly payments go directly to the debt settlement company and not your creditors. And forget about the debt settlement company negotiating anything on your behalf until they are paid in full.
Situation of PR agencies providing public relations service in Turkey conforms to this picture. According to TUHİD-İDA survey, 44% PR agengies create a turnover over 500 thousand dollars. Only 25% of the agencies can obtain consultancy income over 500 thousand dollars. 57% of the agencies have clients less than 10, and they employe 16 people in average. Top three communication services they provide are media relations, corporate social responsibility works, public relation for products and brands. Indeed fields of service in which demand is considered to be increased are respectively media relations (94%), activity management (74%), corporate social responsibility works (69%) and product and brand public relations (66%). In this scene rate of firms of which communication consultancy income actually exceed USD 1,000,000 is only 14%.
Filed 10/2/09 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR ANDREW BUESA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent. B212854 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC378215) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Elihu M. Berle, Judge. Affirmed. Law Office of David W. Allor and David W. Allor for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Rockard J. Delgadillo and Carmen Trutanich, City Attorneys, and Paul L. Winnemore, Deputy City Attorney for Defendant and Respondent. _________________________ 2 This is an appeal from a judgment on the pleadings in an action against the City of Los Angeles (City)1 brought by two former Los Angeles police officers, Andrew Buesa and Michael Cardenas. Plaintiffs seek damages for a violation of their rights under the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (Gov. Code, § 3300 et seq. (POBRA)).2 The gravamen of their complaint is that a perjured declaration submitted by the City deprived them of their statute of limitations defense in an administrative mandamus proceeding over their discharges. The issue is whether they may maintain this as a separate action, or whether under the doctrine of collateral estoppel it is barred by the final judgment denying their petition for administrative mandamus. We conclude that plaintiffs‟ action under POBRA is barred because it constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on the mandate judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY Since this matter is on appeal from a judgment on the pleadings, we take our factual summary from the allegations of the second amended complaint, which is the charging pleading. On February 2, 2002, plaintiffs participated in the arrest of a suspect following a car and foot chase. The same day, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) learned of alleged acts of misconduct by plaintiffs arising from that arrest. The next day, Sergeant Joe Losorelli, of the LAPD Internal Affairs Group, was assigned to investigate the alleged misconduct. On August 15, 2002, Losorelli met with a deputy district attorney in the Los Angeles County District Attorney‟s Office for the purpose of seeking a determination whether criminal charges should be filed against plaintiffs based on the February 2002 incident. Losorelli met with the deputy district attorney again on October 2, 2002, at which time he provided a copy of his investigation and witness statements. 1 Police Chief William J. Bratton was a named defendant in the original complaint, but he was deleted in the second amended complaint, the charging pleading. He is not a party to this appeal. 2 Statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise indicated. 3 According to plaintiffs, the district attorney‟s office opened its criminal investigation against plaintiffs that day. POBRA provides a one-year statute of limitations for bringing of police misconduct charges. The time runs from discovery of the misconduct. (§ 3304, subd. (d).) Section 3304, subdivision (d)(1) tolls the limitations period while a criminal investigation or prosecution is pending. On December 2, 2002, Losorelli asked LAPD superiors to toll the statute of limitations against plaintiffs because of the pending criminal investigation. He asked that the period be tolled from his August 15, 2002 meeting with the district attorney‟s office until the conclusion of the criminal investigation. The criminal investigation was terminated on February 11, 2003, when the deputy district attorney in charge of the case elected not to seek a grand jury indictment. Personnel complaints against plaintiffs were filed at the Los Angeles Police Commission on August 3, 2003, alleging misconduct arising from the February 2002 arrest. They were served the next day. On August 3, 2004, a board of rights found plaintiffs guilty of misconduct and recommended that they be discharged. On September 29, 2004, the chief of police adopted the recommendation that plaintiffs be terminated for failure to report the use of force against a suspect. The chief signed orders removing them from employment, effective that day. Plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) on December 14, 2004 seeking review of their terminations. They alleged that Losorelli furnished a false declaration regarding tolling, which was used by defendant in responding to the petition. Allegedly, Losorelli knew that pursuant to a policy of LAPD and the district attorney‟s office, only the latter was authorized to open a criminal investigation against sworn personnel. According to the complaint, the district attorney‟s office opened the criminal investigation against plaintiffs on October 2, 2002. Plaintiffs allege: “Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that his investigation against plaintiffs was considered a criminal investigation from the beginning (as of February 2, 2002). Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that he first presented the case against plaintiffs to [the deputy district 4 attorney] for possible criminal filing at a July 31, 2002 meeting, when this meeting actually took place on August 15, 2002.” Allegedly, with knowledge that the August 3, 2003 personnel complaints against plaintiffs were time-barred, Losorelli presented a false declaration in the mandamus action “with the intent of fraudulently extending the tolling period for criminal investigations” authorized by section 3304, subdivision (d) “and with the malicious intent to deprive plaintiffs of their rights,” and further employment with the LAPD. According to plaintiffs, they discovered Losorelli‟s wrongful conduct on July 25, 2007, after the administrative mandamus proceeding was concluded. They do not explain the circumstances of that discovery. Plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate was denied by the trial court. The court found the weight of evidence at the administrative hearing supported the decision to terminate plaintiffs. It identified the application of the POBRA statute of limitations as “the main legal issue in the case.” The court noted that both sides had submitted documentary evidence and declarations on the limitations issue, and that no objection to this evidence was made by either side. The trial court found: “The disciplinary action against the petitioners is not barred by the limitations provision of the POBR” because of the tolling provision in section 3304, subdivision (d)(1). The court stated that charges were served on plaintiffs 18 months and two days after the alleged misconduct. It found: “The alleged misconduct was the subject of a criminal investigation that commenced on or before July 31, 2002, when an LAPD investigator met with the District Attorney regarding the matter, and which did not end until February 11, 2003, when the District Attorney decided not to ask the grand jury for an indictment because of the lack of evidence. The one-year limitation period was therefore tolled for six months and eleven days. The investigation was therefore completed and notice of charges were served upon the petitioner[s] within the 5 twelve month period required by section 3304(d).” No appeal was filed from the denial of the petition for administrative mandate and that order is now final.3 Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in this separate action seeking reinstatement on September 27, 2007. They filed a first amended complaint which was the subject of a successful motion for judgment on the pleadings. The motion was granted with leave to amend. Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint dropped the claim for reinstatement, and, instead sought damages against the City for violation of POBRA. City responded with a new motion for judgment on the pleadings. At the first hearing on the motion, the trial court requested additional briefing on whether perjury in a prior proceeding may be the basis for a collateral attack on the judgment. After supplemental briefing on that issue, a second hearing was held. The court found: “The gravamen of this lawsuit is an action under Government Code section 3309.5, but it‟s based upon plaintiffs‟ claim for perjury in the underlying action in the mandamus proceeding.” The court observed that the weight of California authority is that perjury is not a basis for collateral attack on a judgment. It found “that since the gravamen of the complaint in this case is perjury in a prior proceeding and further based upon the principles of law that perjury in a prior proceeding, which is intrinsic fraud, is not grounds for collateral attack, the court is going to grant the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” Judgment was entered in favor of City. This appeal followed. DISCUSSION “The standard of review for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as that for a general demurrer: We treat the pleadings as admitting all of the material facts properly pleaded, but not any contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law contained therein. We may also consider matters subject to judicial notice. We review the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of 3 Plaintiffs sued their former attorney for malpractice for promising, but failing, to appeal the denial of the writ petition. We are not informed of the outcome of that action. 6 action under any theory. [Citation.]” (Dunn v. County of Santa Barbara (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1298.) The issue presented is whether the action for damages under POBRA is barred by the final judgment following denial of plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. Plaintiffs argue they are not collaterally attacking the mandate judgment, which is final, and therefore the doctrines of finality of judgments and collateral estoppel do not apply. Their theory is that their procedural rights under POBRA were thwarted by the alleged perjury by Sergeant Losorelli. Rather than seeking reinstatement to the LAPD, plaintiffs now seek damages for emotional distress, lost earnings and benefits (including pensions), both past and future. They also seek a civil penalty of $25,000 under section 3309.5, and costs of suit. Finally, plaintiffs seek “an order of injunctive or extraordinary relief that the court deems necessary and just to prevent such future similar actions on the part of defendants against other employees.” A. POBRA POBRA “sets forth a list of basic rights and protections which must be afforded all peace officers (see § 3301) by the public entities which employ them. (§§ 3300 et seq.) „It is a catalogue of the minimum rights (§ 3310) the Legislature deems necessary to secure stable employer-employee relations (§ 3301).‟ (Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 135.)” (Gales v. Superior Court (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1596, 1600, fns. omitted (Gales).) Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint alleges an action under section 3309.5, which provides a private right of action for police officers who claim a violation of their rights under POBRA.4 4 In pertinent part, section 3309.5 provides: “(a) It shall be unlawful for any public safety department to deny or refuse to any public safety officer the rights and protections guaranteed to him or her by this chapter. [¶] . . . [¶] (c) The superior court shall have initial jurisdiction over any proceeding brought by any public safety officer against any public safety department for alleged violations of this chapter. [¶] (d)(1) In any case where the superior court finds that a public safety department has violated any of the provisions of this chapter, the court shall render appropriate injunctive or other 7 B. Availability of POBRA Cause Of Action City argues that plaintiffs have not stated a cause of action under POBRA because the alleged perjury was committed in the administrative mandamus proceedings after plaintiffs had been discharged from the LAPD. At that point, City argues, plaintiffs were no longer peace officers as defined by section 3301. Plaintiffs respond that the purpose of POBRA would be defeated if their rights are guaranteed only up to the point of discharge. We need not resolve whether a cause of action lies under POBRA based on a false declaration filed in an administrative mandamus proceeding because the time to challenge the declaration is in the Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 proceeding. A subsequent collateral attack on that basis is not allowed, as we next discuss. C. Finality of Adjudications The California Supreme Court examined the principles underlying the finality of judgments in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1 (Cedars-Sinai), in which it held that there is no separate tort for intentional spoliation of evidence. The court reviewed several cases that denied a tort remedy for the presentation of false evidence or suppression of evidence and observed these decisions “rest on a concern for the finality of adjudication.” (Id. at p. 10.) “This same concern underlies another line of cases that forbid direct or collateral attack on a judgment on the ground extraordinary relief to remedy the violation and to prevent future violations of a like or similar nature, including, but not limited to, the granting of a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or permanent injunction prohibiting the public safety department from taking any punitive action against the public safety officer. [¶] . . . [¶] (e) In addition to the extraordinary relief afforded by this chapter, upon a finding by the superior court that a public safety department, its employees, agents, or assigns, with respect to acts taken within the scope of employment, maliciously violated any provision of this chapter with the intent to injure the public safety officer, the public safety department shall, for each and every violation, be liable for a civil penalty not to exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) to be awarded to the public safety officer whose right or protection was denied . . . . If the court so finds, and there is sufficient evidence to establish actual damages suffered by the officer whose right or protection was denied, the public safety department shall also be liable for the amount of the actual damages.” 8 that evidence was falsified, concealed, or suppressed. After the time for seeking a new trial has expired and any appeals have been exhausted, a final judgment may not be directly attacked and set aside on the ground that evidence has been suppressed, concealed, or falsified; . . . such fraud is „intrinsic‟ rather than „extrinsic.‟ [Citations.] Similarly, under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, a judgment may not be collaterally attacked on the ground that evidence was falsified or destroyed. [Citations.]” (Ibid., italics added.) The claim that the judgment was based on forged documents or perjured testimony does not obviate the force of this policy favoring finality of judgments. As explained in Pico v. Cohn (1891) 91 Cal. 129, upon which the Supreme Court relied, “„[W]e think it is settled beyond controversy that a decree will not be vacated merely because it was obtained by forged documents or perjured testimony. The reason of this rule is, that there must be an end of litigation; and when parties have once submitted a matter . . . for investigation and determination, and when they have exhausted every means for reviewing such determination in the same proceeding, it must be regarded as final and conclusive . . . . [¶] . . . [W]hen [the aggrieved party] has a trial, he must be prepared to meet and expose perjury then and there. . . . The trial is his opportunity for making the truth appear. If, unfortunately, he fails, being overborne by perjured testimony, and if he likewise fails to show the injustice that has been done him on motion for a new trial, and the judgment is affirmed on appeal, he is without remedy. The wrong, in such case, is of course a most grievous one, and no doubt the legislature and the courts would be glad to redress it if a rule could be devised that would remedy the evil without producing mischiefs far worse than the evil to be remedied. Endless litigation, in which nothing was ever finally determined, would be worse than occasional miscarriages of justice . . . .‟” (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11, italics added, quoting Pico v. Cohn, supra, 91 Cal. 129, 133-134; accord, United States v. Throckmorton (1878) 98 U.S. 61, 68-69.) 9 D. Intrinsic Fraud Courts traditionally have distinguished between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud, a distinction which “is of critical importance because intrinsic fraud cannot be used to overthrow a judgment, even where the party was unaware of the fraud at the time and did not have a chance to raise it at trial.” (Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 810, 828.) As we have discussed, the introduction of perjured testimony is a classic example of intrinsic fraud. (See also Kachig v. Boothe (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 634, cited with approval in Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 828.) Plaintiffs argue these principles do not apply because their second amended complaint does not seek to invalidate the denial of the mandate petition and does not seek their reinstatement. They characterize the two actions: “The prior action litigated whether [plaintiffs] were entitled to equitable relief because inter alia the City of Los Angeles brought charges against them beyond the one year statute of limitations. The present action seeks statutory penalties and damages for a different and distinct violation of Government Code § 3309.5 by an employee of the City of Los Angeles.” They rely on Corral v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 1004 (Corral). Corral arose out of an uninsured motorist arbitration between an insured and her insurer. The insurer refused to stipulate that the third party involved in the accident with the insured was uninsured. The arbitration was continued to allow the insured to obtain evidence that the third party was uninsured or to obtain a stipulation to that effect. When neither was obtained, counsel for the insured submitted on the evidence produced at the hearing. The arbitrator found for the insurer. Six weeks later the insured sought to reopen the arbitration based on a new declaration from the third party stating that he was uninsured. The request was denied on the ground the arbitrator lacked authority to grant the relief requested. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1007-1008.) The insured‟s motion in the superior court to vacate the arbitration award was denied as untimely, a ruling that was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. (Id. at p. 1008.) 10 The insured then filed a separate action against the insurer for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. In it, she alleged that at all times the insurer knew that the third party was uninsured, and fraudulently contended at the arbitration hearing that he was insured. In opposition to the defense motion for summary judgment, counsel for the insured submitted his declaration in which he stated that a claims manager for the insured had told him before the arbitration that the insurer would treat the claim as an uninsured motorist case. The attorney declared that, in reliance on these assurances, he made no effort to obtain evidence of the third party‟s lack of insurance coverage. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1008-1009.) The Corral court rejected the insurer‟s argument that the bad faith action was barred by either res judicata or the policies underlying finality of judgments. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 1009.) Instead, it held that each proceeding was based on a different claim of right: the arbitration proceeding was brought to recover benefits under the uninsured motorist provision of the insurance contract; the bad faith cause of action was not based on facts surrounding the automobile collision or the terms of the insurance policy, but on bad faith (refusal to acknowledge that the third party motorist was uninsured) committed after the collision. The court concluded that the bad faith claim constituted a different cause of action, and so was not barred by collateral estoppel. (Id. at pp. 1011-1012.) It held that the bad faith action was “not a collateral attack upon the arbitrator‟s award as it is not directed toward directly preventing the enforcement of that award or defeating rights acquired under it.” (Id. at p. 1013.) The court in Corral acknowledged a then recent case that reached a different result, but disagreed with its holding. The case was Rios v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 811, which held that the doctrine of finality of judgments barred a separate action for bad faith alleging that in an arbitration between insurer and insured, the insurer had presented false evidence and testimony. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1012-1014.) But Rios (and several other decisions) were cited with approval by our Supreme Court in Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at page 10. Of course, the Corral court did not 11 have the benefit of the Supreme Court‟s reasoning in Cedars-Sinai, which was decided some 19 years later. Plaintiffs do not cite or discuss Rios, but argue that Corral should apply because in that case, as in this one, the facts giving rise to the second action occurred during the first proceeding. They contend: “As demonstrated in Corral, it is the extraordinary obligations of the defendant that allows the second action to proceed. In that case, it was the insurance company‟s obligation of good faith and fair dealing. . . . Similarly, in the present case the City of Los Angeles cannot get away with its conduct at the hearing on the writ where it presented the perjurous [sic] declaration because it had an independent obligation not to violate [plaintiffs‟] rights under Government Code, § 3309.5.” Here, to prevail in their action for damages, plaintiffs had to prove a violation of POBRA based upon defendant‟s reliance on a perjured declaration to show that the tolling of the time to file disciplinary actions lasted long enough to render their discharges timely. This goes to the heart of the trial court‟s finding in the mandate proceeding. To the extent that Corral stands for the proposition that the finality of judgments doctrine does not apply to a separate bad faith action arising from the presentation of false or perjured testimony in an earlier proceeding, we disagree, and instead follow Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th 1 and Rios, supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at pp. 818-819. Plaintiffs also rely on Miller v. Campbell, Warburton, Fitzsimmons, Smith, Mendel & Pastore (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1331 (Miller). In that case, the executor of an estate hired a law firm to represent her in connection with her duties. At the conclusion of the probate matter, the firm requested and was awarded its fees except for one category which the probate court found to involve work for the executor in her individual capacity. The firm did not appeal that decision. Instead, it filed a new action seeking quantum meruit recovery of the denied fees directly from the client. The trial court held the action was barred by the final judgment in the probate case. The Court of Appeal reversed. Significantly, it found that the probate court did not decide that the law firm was not entitled to the additional fees, but only that the fees were not payable out of the estate. 12 (Id. at p. 1341.) As the Miller court explained, the probate court never ruled on the firm‟s entitlement to fees directly from its client, and therefore there was no basis for collateral estoppel. (Id. at p. 1343.) The case before us is quite different. The court ruled on the tolling issue in the mandate proceeding. Indeed it was the central question in the case. “„Collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation of an issue only if (1) the issue is identical to an issue decided in a prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the issue was necessarily decided; (4) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; and (5) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to the prior proceeding or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding. (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341.)‟ (Zevnik v. Superior Court (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 76, 82.)” (Plumley v. Mockett (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1048-1049.) That describes the present case. Because the tolling issue was actually litigated in the mandate proceeding, a new claim based on the allegedly perjured declaration is a collateral attack on the mandate decision. Perjured testimony cannot be the basis for a separate proceeding. (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11.) In light of our conclusion, we need not and do not address City‟s other arguments. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. City is to have its costs on appeal. CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION. EPSTEIN, P. J. We concur: WILLHITE, J. MANELLA, J. Source: barstowwatch.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: businessbankruptcyco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com
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